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Abstract5
This paper explores the principle that knowledge is fragile, in that6
whenever S knows that S doesn’t know that S knows that p, S thereby fails7
to know p. Fragility is motivated by the infelicity of dubious assertions,8
utterances which assert p while acknowledging higher order ignorance of p.9
Fragility is interestingly weaker than KK, the principle that if S knows10
p, then S knows that S knows p. Existing theories of knowledge which11
deny KK by accepting a Margin for Error principle can be conservatively12
extended with Fragility.13
1 Introduction14
Sosa 2009 introduces the phenomenon of ‘dubious assertion’, infelicitous utter-15
ances concerning higher order ignorance. In dubious assertions, an agent asserts16
a claim while raising doubts about her higher order epistemic standing with17
respect to p.18
(1) #p, but I don’t know whether I know that p.19
This paper explains the infelicity of dubious assertions by defending a new20
principle about knowledge, Fragility. I say that knowledge is fragile, so that it21
cannot withstand the knowledge of higher order ignorance:22
(2) Fragility. If S knows that S doesn’t know that S knows p, then S doesn’t23
know p.24
Fragility implies that (1) is unknowable, and hence infelicitous given a knowledge25
norm on assertion.26
The paper proceeds in several parts. §2 reviews extant work on dubious27
assertions. §3 explores Fragility in greater detail, considering why one might28
accept the principle, comparing a few alternative formulations of Fragility, and29
explaining how Fragility is related to the unknowability of dubious assertions.30
One main point is that Fragility is interestingly weaker than the KK principle:31
(3) KK. If S knows that p, then S knows that S knows that p.32
Defenders of KK have recently used dubious assertions to motivate the validity33
of KK. This paper suggests that such an argument is inconclusive. Dubious34
assertion can be explained without resorting to KK, as long as we accept Fragility.35
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To explore Fragility in more detail, §4 characterizes Fragility within epistemic36
logic, to show that Fragility is interestingly weaker than KK. §5 strengthens the37
case for Fragility by showing that Fragility can be added to extant theories of38
knowledge which reject KK on the basis of Margin for Error principles, where39
knowing p requires that p couldn’t easily have been false. In particular, §540
develops a theory of knowledge which validates Fragility while invalidating KK41
and respecting a version of the Margin for Error requirement. §6 extends the42
theory to other types of dubious assertion.43
2 Dubious assertions44
The central data point for this paper, from Sosa 2009, is the infelicity of sentences45
which assert p while reporting higher order ignorance about p:46
(1) #p, but I don’t know whether I know that p.47
To illustrate the infelicity of dubious assertions, Greco 2014 imagines an extended48
discourse in which an agent asserts p while later implying that they don’t know49
that they know p.50
(4) A: When did Queen Elizabeth die?51
B: She died in 1603.52
A: How do you know that?53
B: I didn’t say I know it.54
A: So you’re saying you don’t know when Queen Elizabeth died?55
B: I’m not saying that either. I’m saying she died in 1603. Maybe I56
know that she died in 1603, maybe I don’t. Honestly, I’ve got no57
idea. But you didn’t ask about what I know, did you? You just58
asked when she died. (Greco 2014 p. 667)59
Such discourses sound incoherent, and for the same reason conjunctions like (1)60
are infelicitous.61
The literature contains a few different reactions to dubious assertions. Sosa62
2009 uses the data to challenge the knowledge norm of assertion (defended in63
Williamson 2000 for example).64
(5) KA. S ought: assert p only if S knows p.65
KA can explain the infelicity of Moore paradoxical sentences like:66
(6) #p, but I don’t know that p.67
Such sentences are unknowable, and hence unassertable by KA. But Sosa 200968
suggests that KA undergenerates with respect to (1). The problem is that many69
defenders of KA reject the thesis that knowledge freely iterates.70
(7) KK. If S knows that p, then S knows that S knows that p.71
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If KK fails, then there are agents who know p without knowing that they know72
p. But there seems to be no barrier to such agents knowing that they are in just73
this predicament. In that case, KA allows them to assert (1).74
By contrast, other recent work (Stalnaker 2009 p. 404, Cohen and Comesaña75
2013, Greco 2014, Greco 2015, and Das and Salow 2018) embraces the knowledge76
norm of assertion and uses the infelicity of (1) to motivate KK.1 If KK is valid,77
then (1) is unknowable. For if S knows (1), then S knows p, and so by KK knows78
that she knows p. But if S knows (1) then she also knows that she doesn’t know79
whether she knows p. But this contradicts the Factivity of knowledge.80
(8) Factivity. If S knows p, then p.81
Finally, Benton 2013 and Williamson 2013a offer explanations of the infelicity82
of (1) which rely on KA without KK. For example, Benton 2013 suggests that83
while asserting (1) satisfies KA, it violates secondary rational requirements that84
follow from KA. When agents are subject to a norm, they incur a secondary85
requirement to perform actions they believe satisfy the norm. Conversely, if they86
believe that they do not satisfy the norm in acting, then they are criticizable. To87
explain the infelicity of (1), this proposal could be enriched with the requirement88
that whenever someone fails to know whether they satisfy the primary norms89
for performing an action, they violate the secondary norms for performing that90
action. Similarly, Williamson 2013a analogizes assertions like (1) to paradoxical91
utterances like:92
(9) Stand to attention!—and I don’t know whether I have authority to order93
you to stand to attention.94
These secondary explanations of (1) may ultimately succeed (although see Greco95
2014 and Greco 2015 for skepticism).2 But the rest of this paper pursues a more96
direct approach.97
This paper holds fixed the knowledge norm of assertion and the infelicity of98
(1) and its ilk. The paper defends the thesis that sentences like (1) are infelicitous99
because they are unknowable. To explain the unknowability of (1), the paper100
develops and defends the following principle:101
(2) Fragility. If S knows that S doesn’t know that S knows p, then S doesn’t102
know p.103
Before proceeding, it’s worth flagging that the phenomenon of dubious assertion104
extends beyond the data point in (1), in two respects. First, we get similar105
infelicities when we replace ignorance with other epistemic states, including106
1See Smithies 2012 for analogous arguments in the case of justification.
2In particular, Greco 2015 suggests that dubious assertions like (1) are irrational to believe,
not just bad to assert. Fragility can explain this further fact if we assume a weak form of a
knowledge norm on belief: that it is irrational to believe anything which is a priori guaranteed
to be unknowable. Similarly, suppose we accept the Reduction principle, discussed below, that
S is justified in believing p if and only if for all S knows, S knows p. In that case if Fragility is
known by S then S does not justifiedly believe (1), since S knows that (1) is unknowable.
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doubt, belief, and justification. Second, similar assertions are dubious which107
involve even higher iterations of knowledge. For simplicity, the next few sections108
focus on (1). Once I have developed the theory in detail, I then explore more109
complex examples in §6.110
3 Fragility111
The thesis of this paper is that knowledge is fragile:112
(2) Fragility. If S knows that S doesn’t know that S knows p, then S doesn’t113
know p.114
This section explicates Fragility by exploring a few equivalent formulations. (2)115
says that knowledge is fragile, because (2) articulates a connection between116
knowledge and defeat. If you learn that you don’t know that you know p, you117
learn that you are in some way epistemically defective with respect to p. If118
you learn that you are epistemically defective with respect to p, this knowledge119
defeats your knowledge of p. Knowledge of p is fragile in the face of evidence120
that one is not epistemically ideal with respect to p.3121
Thinking about Fragility in terms of defeat helps clarify the relationship122
between Fragility and KK. Fragility allows that an agent can know p without123
knowing that she knows p. But things are different if the agent becomes aware124
that they are in such a predicament. If an agent learns they knew p while failing125
to know that they knew p, something changes in their epistemic position. New126
information about their non-ideal status leads to a failure of their knowledge of127
p.128
To better illustrate Fragility, consider an example of higher order ignorance:129
the unwitting historian (Radford 1966, Feldman 2005).130
Jean insists that she knows nothing about English history. As a131
matter of fact, she studied English history in secondary school, but132
doesn’t recall taking the course. She hasn’t forgotten the content of133
what she learned, however. If you force her to guess as to matters134
such as when William the Conqueror landed in England, the dates of135
Queen Elizabeth’s reign, and so on, she’ll reliably respond correctly.136
But if told that her answers are correct, she’ll be quite surprised, as137
she takes herself to have no way of knowing these facts. (Greco 2014138
p. 658.)139
Jean the unwitting historian is plausibly an example of higher order ignorance.140
Although she knows when Queen Elizabeth ruled, she doesn’t know that she141
knows this. Fragility implies that there is something unstable about Jean’s142
predicament. If Jean is apprised of her higher order ignorance, she either loses143
3Here, I assume that anything an agent knows is part of her evidence. This is weaker than
the principle that an agent’s knowledge is exactly their evidence, a principle embraced in
Williamson 2000.
4
her first order knowledge or gains second order knowledge. On the other hand,144
Fragility allows that Jean can believe that she doesn’t know that she knows p in145
the original case. It only insists that this belief is not knowledge.146
It’s worth considering one more consequence of Fragility. Greco 2014 observes147
that pragmatic accounts of dubious assertion such as Benton 2013 and Williamson148
2013a predict that higher order ignorance gives rise to assertoric dilemmas: cases149
in which a speaker has no rationally permissible response to their interlocutor.4150
Given the views [Benton 2013] suggests, speakers will find themselves151
in a sort of awkward dilemma whenever they know that P without152
knowing that they know. In such cases, while they will be able153
to permissibly assert that P, if their permission to assert that P is154
challenged, they will not be able to permissibly defend themselves.155
It strikes me as implausible that our conversational norms allow for156
such situations. (Greco 2014, p. 667.)157
Fragility has a similar consequence. For suppose S knows p and doesn’t know158
that they know p. Now suppose that S asserts p, and their interlocutor asks159
them whether they know p. How can they respond? They cannot answer ‘yes’,160
for they do not know that they know p. They cannot answer ‘no’, for they don’t161
know that they don’t know p. Strangely, they also can’t answer ‘I don’t know’,162
because Fragility implies that they don’t know that they don’t know that they163
know p. If they believe they know, they may say so, as Fragility allows them to164
know that they think they know. But suppose that they do not in fact believe165
they know. As we’ll see in §6, Fragility forbids them from knowing that they166
don’t believe they know, since this would imply that they know they don’t know167
they know. In sum, Fragility along with the knowledge norm of assertion implies168
that in such cases there is simply no permissible response to their interlocutor.169
The best they can do might be the following:170
(10) A: When did Queen Elizabeth die?171
B: Queen Elizabeth died in 1603.172
A: How do you know that?173
B: I didn’t say I know it.174
A: So you’re saying you don’t know when Queen Elizabeth died?175
B: I’m not saying that either. I’m saying she died in 1603.176
A: So you’re saying you don’t know whether you know when Queen177
Elizabeth died?178
B: No, I’m not saying that. All I’m saying is Queen Elizabeth died in179
1603.180
Such cases are assertoric dilemmas. Greco 2014 suggests that such situations181
should be ruled out by our conversational norms and best epistemology. I see no182
reason for such a sanguine view. Sometimes there is no way to make the best of183
a bad situation. Once an agent has fallen into higher order ignorance, perhaps184
they simply have no good way of responding to forceful inquiry on the matter.185
4Perhaps the forced march Sorites is another example of an assertoric dilemma.
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On the other hand, one might think that the very act of inquiry in the above186
may be a way of escaping higher order ignorance. Perhaps once S is asked187
whether they knows p, their epistemic position changes. Either they come to188
know that they know p, or they come to know that they don’t know that they189
know p. In the latter case, Fragility implies that they also lose their knowledge190
of p. In such a case, S can assert that they don’t know that they know p, and191
then retract their previous assertion of p. In this way, perhaps Fragility has a192
small advantage over pragmatic accounts of dubious assertion, since Fragility193
can predict how higher order defeat might resolve assertoric dilemmas.194
To better understand Fragility, consider another of its equivalent forms:195
(11) Iterated Ignorance. If S knows p and S doesn’t know that S knows p,196
then S doesn’t know that S doesn’t know that S knows p.197
In this form, Fragility encodes an iterative conception of higher order ignorance.198
Suppose that you know p but fail to know that you know p. In this case, you199
have higher order ignorance—ignorance about your knowledge. This ignorance200
iterates. Agents who know p without knowing that they know p are also agents201
who are ignorant of this fact.202
For another formulation of Fragility, let’s introduce the dual of knowledge,203
epistemic possibility. p is epistemically possible for S just in case it holds for204
all S knows, just in case p is consistent with what they know, just in case the205
agent does not know that p is false. Then Fragility embodies a kind of optimism206
about the epistemic possibility of iterated knowledge.207
(12) Optimism. If S knows p, then for all S knows, S knows that S knows p.208
When an agent knows p, they may fail to know that they know p. But Optimism209
says that even in such a case, it is epistemically possible for them that they know210
that they know. Optimism is optimistic, because it says that when we do know p,211
we can never rule out the possibility that we are in the better epistemic position212
of knowing that we know p. Optimism allows us to compare Fragility with KK213
straightforwardly. Fragility is strictly weaker than KK, since it replaces knowing214
that one knows with the epistemic possibility of knowing that one knows.215
We can also understand Optimism in another way. Building on Lenzen 1978,216
Williamson 2000 (p. 46), Stalnaker 2006, Williamson 2013a, Rosenkranz 2018,217
and Carter and Goldstein 2021 we might define justified belief as a state that is218
epistemically indistinguishable from knowing.5219
(13) Reduction. S is justified in believing p if and only if for all S knows, S220
knows p.221
Given Reduction, Optimism and hence Fragility is equivalent to the JK principle:222
(14) JK. If S knows p, then S is justified in believing that S knows p.223
As Berker 2008 observes, Williamson 2000’s arguments against KK do not224
5For similar views, see Bird 2007 and Ichikawa 2014.
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immediately extend to JK, since justified belief does not require safety from225
error. On the other hand, Reduction is a controversial thesis about justification,226
and so the connection between Fragility and BK is by no means conclusive.227
I began the paper with a discussion of dubious assertion. The main data228
point is that dubious assertions are unknowable, so that:229
(15) Ignorance of the Dubious. S doesn’t know that: p and S doesn’t230
know that S knows that p.231
Suppose that anyone who knows a conjunction knows each conjunct, and vice232
versa. Then Ignorance of the Dubious is equivalent to Fragility. For suppose233
S knows the conjunction: p and S doesn’t know that S knows that p. Then S234
knows p and S knows that S doesn’t know that S knows that p, contradicting235
Fragility. Conversely, suppose that Fragility fails. Then there is some agent who236
knows p while knowing that they don’t know that they know p. But then they237
can conjoin this knowledge, to learn that the conjunction p and S doesn’t know238
that S knows that p, contradicting Ignorance of the Dubious.239
As we saw above, defenders of KK have used Ignorance of the Dubious240
to motivate KK, because KK implies Ignorance of the Dubious. This paper241
undercuts that argument. In particular, we’ve now seen that Ignorance of the242
Dubious is equivalent to Fragility given modest assumptions. In the rest of the243
paper, I’ll argue that Fragility is weaker than KK and interesting in its own244
right. §4 shows that a theory of knowledge can consistently embrace Fragility245
without accepting KK. §5 strengthens this argument by showing that Fragility246
is also compatible with a version of the Margin for Error principles that have247
motivated recent attacks on KK. Opponents of KK can strengthen their theories248
with Fragility in order to explain Ignorance of the Dubious. For this reason,249
Ignorance of the Dubious does not provide a compelling argument for KK.250
4 Fragility in epistemic logic251
My thesis is that knowledge is fragile. But what exactly does Fragility require252
of a theory of knowledge? Do we have any guarantee that Fragility is even a253
consistent principle, or that it really is weaker than KK? This section exploits254
familiar tools from epistemic logic to show that Fragility is consistent and weaker255
than KK.256
I interpret the knowledge of a single agent as a modal necessity operator257
K, with epistemic possibility as its dual M . To do so, introduce an epistemic258
accessibility relation R, and say that Kp is true at world w just in case p is true259
at every world v R-accessible from w. Then p is true for all S knows (Mp) just260
in case there is some R-accessible world at which p is true.261
Definition 1.262
1. R is an epistemic accessibility relation which relates any world w to any world263
v that is epistemically possible for the agent in w.264
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2. Rw abbreviates {v | wRv}.265
3. wR2u if and only if ∃v : wRv & vRu.266
4. A abbreviates {w | w |= A}.267
Definition 2.268
1. w |= p if and only if w(p) = 1269
2. w |= ¬A if and only if w 6|= A270
3. w |= A ∧B if and only if w |= A and w |= B271
4. w |= KA if and only if for every v in Rw : v |= A272
5. w |= MA if and only if for some v in Rw : v |= A273
In epistemic logic, different properties of knowledge correspond to different274
properties of epistemic accessibility. Consider the requirement that knowledge275
is factive, so that anything known is true. In the framework above, Factivity276
corresponds to the reflexivity of epistemic accessibility: every world w is accessible277
from itself.278
In this setting, the KK principle corresponds to the transitivity of accessibility.279
KKA is true at w just in case A is true at every world accessible from a world280
accessible from w. In other words, KKA is true at w just in case A is true281
throughout R2w, where R2 relates w and u just in case u can be reached by a282
world reached by w. In this way, iterated knowledge universally quantifies over283
an accessibility relation R2 derived from epistemic accessibility. Now KK says284
that KA implies KKA. This means that whenever A is true throughout Rw,285
we are guaranteed that A is also true throughout R2w. This itself is equivalent286
to the requirement that R2w ⊆ Rw, so that u is accessible from w whenever u287
is accessible from v and v is accessible from w.288
I now represent Fragility in epistemic logic. For simplicity, I focus on a289
particular form of Fragility, Optimism. In this formulation, Fragility says that if290
S knows p, then it is possible that S knows that S knows p.291
(16) KA |= MKKA292
Fragility corresponds to an interesting variant of transitivity. Fragility says that293
every world can see some world where every world reachable by two applications294
of accessibility can also be reached from the base world.295
Definition 3. R is jump transitive if and only if ∀w∃v ∈ Rw : R2v ⊆ Rw.296
Observation 1. Fragility is valid if and only if R is jump transitive.6297
6By contraposition of Optimism: suppose R is jump transitive, and suppose that w |=
KMMA. Then ∀v ∈ Rw : R2v ∩A 6= ∅. By jump transitivity, ∃v∗ ∈ Rw : R2v∗ ⊆ Rw. So
Rw ∩A 6= ∅. So w |= MA. Conversely, suppose that R is not jump transitive. Then ∀v ∈
Rw : ∃z ∈ R2v : z 6∈ Rw. Now let A =
{
w | ∃v ∈ Rw : z ∈ R2v & z 6∈ Rw
}
. w |= KMMA,
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Fragility corresponds to a coherent constraint on epistemic accessibility. This298
constraint is compatible with the reflexivity of accessibility, so that Fragility is299
compatible with Factivity. Fragility also has some small consequences for any300
modal operator that satisfies it: for example, it implies that accessibility is serial,301
so that every world sees some other world. This in turn corresponds to the302
requirement that KA implies MA, itself a consequence of Factivity.303
Our characterization of Fragility allows us to consider the relationship between304
KK and Fragility. First, we can see that KK and Factivity imply Fragility. For305
suppose R is transitive and reflexive. Then every world w trivially sees a world306
v (in particular, itself) where R2v ⊆ Rw. By contrast, Fragility does not imply307
KK. Epistemic accessibility can be jump transitive without being transitive.7308
Of course, Fragility could be logically weaker than KK without being philo-309
sophically weaker. Perhaps KK is the only plausible theory of knowledge that310
validates Fragility, thereby explaining Ignorance of the Dubious. This response311
is unconvincing. We saw in the last section that Fragility can be understood in312
terms of at least three philosophical intuitions about knowledge: (i) that learning313
one’s epistemic status with respect to p is non-ideal can defeat one’s knowledge314
of p; (ii) that higher order ignorance of a certain kind iterates; and (iii) that315
knowing p always leaves open the possibility that one’s epistemic status with316
respect to p is even better. The next section takes this defense a step further. I317
develop a theory of knowledge which combines Fragility with a version of the318
Margin for Error principles that motivate recent attacks on KK.8319
5 Fragility and margins for error320
Stemming from Williamson 2000, much recent criticism of KK relies on some321
kind of Safety or Margin for Error principle. This section develops a theory322
where knowledge satisfies both Fragility and a version of the Margin for Error323
principle. Fragility requires that the margin for error when appearance perfectly324
matches reality is sufficiently smaller than the margin for error at all other325
worlds. The result is that opponents of KK can explain dubious assertion by326
enriching their theory with further constraints on knowledge.327
since ∀v ∈ Rw : v |= MMA, since for arbitrary such v we have ∃z, u : vRu & uRz & z ∈ A.
But w 6|= MA, since ¬∃v ∈ Rw : v ∈ A. This proof implicitly relies on the definition of an
epistemic frame, a class of all interpretations of atomic sentences in which accessibility is jump
transitive. For simplicity I suppress this complication by assuming that every set of worlds
is the meaning of some sentence. In addition, this proof focuses on an equivalent version of
Fragility, that KMMA implies MA
7Jump transitivity concerns the relationship between Rw and R2v for some v or other.
Transitivity concerns the relationship between Rw and R2w. Jump transitivity is also distinct
from another weakening of transitivity we might call ‘possible transitivity’: that every world
sees another world where accessibility is transitive (∀w∃v ∈ Rw : R2v ⊆ Rv). These properties
differ: jump transitivity compares the doubly accessible points at v with the singly accessible
points at w, not the singly accessible points at v.




Safety says that knowledge is incompatible with the chance of being wrong.9329
(17) Safety. If S knows that p, then S’s belief that p could not easily have330
been false.331
Williamson 2000 exploits Safety principles to undermine the KK principle. In332
particular, the relevant notion of ‘easily being wrong’ fails to iterate. Whether one333
easily could have been wrong concerns what happens at nearby possible worlds.334
But in order to know that one knows, Safety requires one to be epistemically335
successful not just at nearby worlds, but also at any worlds that are nearby a336
nearby world.10337
In many cases of interest to opponents of KK, an agent believes p and couldn’t338
easily have failed to so believe. In such cases, Safety is equivalent to the simpler339
Margin for Error principle:340
(18) Margin for Error. If S knows that p, then p could not easily have341
been false.342
Much debate about KK has concerned the exact relationship between Safety343
and Margin for Error. Defenders of KK have suggested that Margin for Error is344
inappropriately stronger than Safety. Opponents of KK have disagreed.11 In the345
rest of this paper, we suppress this complexity, and consider the prospects for346
combining Margin for Error and Fragility.347
To investigate this question precisely, we turn to Williamson 2013a’s frame-348
work for exploring Margin for Error within epistemic logic.12 Williamson 2013a349
introduces a special class of epistemic models, which connect margins for error350
to the difference between appearance and reality. We imagine the agent gaining351
information about the value of a parameter like temperature, tree height, or352
whatever. We then model the distinction between appearance and reality by a353
pair of values, r and a. r is the real value of the parameter, while a is the way354
the parameter appears to the agent. We only consider the agent’s knowledge355
of the values of these parameters, and so let a possible world be a pair (r, a) of356
these two values, where R(r, a) is the set of epistemic possibilities at world (r, a).357
If the temperature is some real value r and apparent value a, then the agent’s358
knowledge is constrained by a margin for error around a. In order to know that359
the value is in a certain range, this range must include the entire margin for360
error. This margin for error is large enough to include the real value r, but may361
include more as well.362
To reach a precise theory of margins for error, Williamson 2013a proposes363
three constraints. First, we assume that appearances are luminous.364
9For influential defenses of Safety, see Sosa 1999, Williamson 2000, and Pritchard 2005
among others. For recent criticism of Safety, see Goldstein and Hawthorne 2021.
10Although see Das and Salow 2018 for a way of reconciling Safety principles with KK.
11For representative samples of this debate, see Berker 2008, Srinivasan 2013, and Goldstein
and Waxman 2020.
12See Goodman 2013 and Carter 2018 for interesting expansions of this framework.
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(19) Appearance Luminosity. If (r, a)R(r′, a′), then a = a′365
Since accessible points never differ in the value of appearance, we usually confine366
our discussion below to the set of real values that are epistemically possible at a367
given world. We let Real(r, a) denote this set ({r′ | ∃a : (r, a)R(r′, a)}).368
Second, the agent retains some ignorance even when appearance perfectly369
matches reality. As Williamson 2013a observes, the agent’s ‘perceptual apparatus370
is not perfectly discriminating’ (p. 5).371
(20) Modesty. {(a, a)} ⊂ R(a, a)372
Even when appearance matches reality, there is some range of values around a373
which are epistemically possible.374
The final constraint is that epistemic possibility is a function of the distance375
between appearance and reality. For simplicity, suppose that r and a are numbers.376
Then as the distance between r and a shrinks, the epistemically accessible worlds377
must also shrink.378
(21) Distance. R(r, a) ⊆ R(r′, a) iff |r − a| ≤ |r′ − a|.379
Distance implies that an agent’s epistemic position improves as the distance380
between reality and appearance decreases. Holding fixed a and varying the381
real value r, we produce a nested series of spheres of epistemic accessibility,382
with R(a, a) the innermost sphere, and with epistemic possibility increasing as r383
increases in distance from a.13384
With these constraints in place, Williamson 2013a then offers a particular385
theory of accessibility. The actual margin for error around a at any point is the386
sum of the distance between r and a, and a fixed minimum margin for error387
c. At (a, a), the margin for error around a is simply c. As we move away from388
(a, a) to points (r, a) where appearance does not match reality, the margin grows389
from c to the sum |r − a|+ c.390
Definition 4.391
1. Any world w is a pair (r, a) of a real value r and apparent value a.392
2. The minimum margin for error, c, is a fixed positive constant.393
3. (r, a)R(r′, a′) if and only if a = a′ and |r′ − a| ≤ |r − a|+ c.394
4. Real(r, a) = {r′ : (r′, a) ∈ R(r, a)}.395
5. Real2(r, a) = {r′′ : ∃r′ ∈ Real(r, a) : r′′ ∈ Real(r′, a)}.396
To illustrate this theory, consider Figure 1.397
Here we represents an agent’s knowledge of the temperature, using degrees398
of Fahreinheit. The temperature appears to be 75 degrees, and the margin for399
error is 5. This theory gives rise to characteristic epistemic differences between400
13For further discussion of the psychological plausibility of Modesty and Distance, see Nagel
2013.
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Figure 1: A model of Distance with a = 75, c = 5
the good case where reality matches appearance, and bad cases where it does401
not. So consider the good case (75, 75). Arrows denote the upper and lower402
bounds of epistemic accessibility from the origin. Here Real(75, 75) = [70, 80]403
is the range of possible real values of the temperature. Real(80, 75) = [65, 85].404
So when the temperature is 75 degrees, the agent considers 80 degrees possible;405
and when it is 80 degrees, the agent treats 85 degrees as epistemically possible.406
But when the temperature is 75 degrees, the agent does not treat 85 degrees as407
epistemically possible.408
Now consider Fragility. There are worlds (r, a) where Fragility holds locally, so409
that (r, a) accesses worlds (r′, a) where R2(r′, a) ⊆ R(r, a). For example, (75, 75)410
is possible at (80, 75), and Real2(75, 75) = [65, 85] = [65, 85] = Real(80, 75). But411
there are also worlds where Fragility does not hold. For example, Real2(75, 75)412
is not included within Real(77, 75). But (75, 75) is the strongest epistemic state413
accessible from (77, 75). So at (77, 75), the agent knows that the real value of414
the temperature is between 68 and 82, but she has also ruled out that she knows415
that she knows this.416
We can generalize from this case. Fragility is incompatible with Appearance417
Luminosity, Modesty, and Distance. Appearance Luminosity and Modesty imply418
that (a, a) accesses some worlds distinct from (a, a). Let (r, a) be the furthest419
accessible world from (a, a). Distance implies that Real(a, a) ⊂ Real(r, a). But420
Distance implies that Real(r, a) = Real2(a, a). So Real(a, a) ⊂ Real2(a, a). But421
Distance also implies that Real2(a, a) is a proper subset of Real2(r′, a), for422
any (r′, a) accessible from (a, a). So (a, a) cannot access a point (r′, a) where423
Real2(r′, a) ⊆ Real(a, a).424
5.2 Fragility425
If we want to validate Fragility, we must reject one of Appearance Luminosity,426
Modesty, and Distance. In the rest of this section, I hold fixed Appearance427
Luminosity and Modesty, and explore the prospects for rejecting Distance. Here,428
I follow both Cohen and Comesaña 2013 and Goodman 2013, although the429
former validates KK and the latter invalidates Fragility. In the rest of this430
section, I make room for Fragility by weakening Distance and allowing the431
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possibility of varying margins for error. In this setting, Fragility corresponds to432
the requirement that the margin for error when appearance matches reality is433
sufficiently smaller than the margin at any other world. More precisely, Fragility434
corresponds to a simple epistemological principle: whenever an agent knows p in435
the good case where reality matches appearance, she knows that she knows p.436
To begin with, we minimally weaken Distance so that as the distance between437
reality and appearance increases, the epistemic possibilities may stay the same438
without increasing.439
(22) Weak Distance. R(r, a) ⊆ R(r′, a) only if |r − a| ≤ |r′ − a|.440
Consider the worlds (75, 75) and (76, 75). In the former, reality matches appear-441
ances exactly; in the latter, reality is slightly different from appearance. Distance442
implies that R(75, 75) ⊂ R(76, 75). By contrast, Weak Distance instead allows443
that R(76, 75) may equal R(75, 75).444
When we replace Distance with Weak Distance, we can validate Fragility.445
Weak Distance implies that Fragility holds at every possible world if and only if446
KK holds in the good case where reality matches appearance (so that R2(a, a) =447
R(a, a)).448
Observation 2. Weak Distance implies that Fragility is valid if and only if KK449
holds at (a, a).14450
This is a significant consequence of Fragility. Along with Factivity, it implies451
that any world (r, a) accessible from (a, a) has the same epistemic possibilities452
as (a, a). What is epistemically possible need not increase as reality diverges453
from appearance.454
We can also understand Fragility in terms of the connection between knowl-455
edge and justification. Williamson 2013a introduces a notion of justified belief456
at (r, a) in terms of what is known at (a, a). Where S is doxastic accessibility,457
S(r, a) = R(a, a). This is an internalist notion of justified belief which ignores458
the real value and depends only on the apparent value. Agents in the good459
case where appearance matches reality are fortunate enough to believe exactly460
what they know. Like Distance, Weak Distance ensures that knowledge implies461
justification, so that R(a, a) is included in R(r, a) for all (r, a).462
Fragility has interesting connections to justification. An agent is justified in463
believing p just in case p is known in the good case. Fragility says that knowledge464
in the good case iterates. So given this theory of justification, Fragility is465
equivalent to the principle, endorsed in Stalnaker 2006, that an agent is justified466
in believing p if and only if she is justified in believing that she knows p.467
Fragility has another consequence. Williamson 2013b defines a special class of468
Gettier cases, which structurally resemble fake barn cases. In this class of ‘purely469
14Fragility requires (a, a) to see some (r, a) where R2(r, a) ⊆ R(a, a). Since |a− a| ≤ |r− a|,
Weak Distance implies that R(a, a) ⊆ R(r, a) and hence R2(a, a) ⊆ R2(r, a). So Weak Distance
implies that R2(a, a) ⊆ R2(r, a) ⊆ R(a, a), and so whenever S knows A at (a, a), she also knows
that she knows A. Conversely, suppose that the KK holds at (a, a), so that R2(a, a) ⊆ R(a, a).
Weak Distance implies that R(a, a) ⊆ R(r, a) for all (r, a). So every (r, a) sees (a, a), where
R2(a, a) ⊆ R(r, a). So Fragility holds at every world.
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veridical’ Gettier case, an agent fails to know p despite having no false justified470
beliefs. Let S(r, a) be the strongest claim that the agent believes justifiedly471
(R(a, a)). Then (r, a) has purely veridical Gettier cases just in case S(r, a) is472
true at (r, a) even though S(r, a) is strictly smaller than R(r, a).473
(23) Purely veridical Gettier cases exist at (r, a) if and only if (r, a) ∈ S(r, a)474
and S(r, a) ⊂ R(r, a).475
Now a consequence of the previous observation is that Weak Distance implies476
that Fragility is valid if and only if there are no purely veridical Gettier cases.477
For suppose Fragility is valid. Then KK holds at (a, a), and so for every (r, a)478
in S(r, a), we have that S(r, a) = R(a, a) = R(r, a). Conversely, the absence of479
purely veridical Gettier cases implies that KK holds at (a, a), and so implies480
the validity of Fragility. In ruling out purely veridical Gettier cases, I agree481
with the theory in Cohen and Comesaña 2013, and depart from the theories in482
Williamson 2013a, Goodman 2013, Weatherson 2013, and Carter 2018.483
Fragility also has consequences for margins for error. On some conceptions484
of margins for error, the validity of KK even locally at (a, a) is untenable.485
Williamson 2013b considers and rejects the possibility of cliff-edge knowledge at486
a world (r, a), where either S knows that the real value is at least r or S knows487
that the real value is at most r.15488
(24) Cliff-edge knowledge. S has cliff-edge knowledge at (r, a) if and only489
if ∃n : Real(r, a) = [r, n] or Real(r, a) = [n, r].490
Drawing on Goodman 2013, Williamson 2013b argues that cliff-edge knowledge491
violates a version of Safety, which says that reality could always have been492
slightly different while appearances remained the same.16493
(25) ∀(r, a)∃c > 0 : [r − c, r + c] ⊆ Real(r, a)494
We can distinguish this safety requirement from another, which simply holds495
that appearances give us unspecific evidence about real values.17496
(26) ∀(r, a)∃c > 0 : [a− c, a + c] ⊆ Real(r, a)497
Given Weak Distance, cliff-edge knowledge exists if KK is locally valid.18 For498
suppose KK holds at (r, a), so that R2(r, a) ⊆ R(r, a). Factivity implies that499
15Compare Stalnaker 2009, p. 406 offers a defense of cliff edge knowledge. For a response to
this defense, see Hawthorne and Magidor 2010, p. 1092.
16Compare Weatherson 2013, p. 67.
17This is implied by a principle Goodman 2013 calls Appearance Constraint.
18Strictly speaking, this claim holds only if epistemic accessibility produces closed intervals
of possible real values. Suppose instead that at (70, 70) the accessible real values are in the
open interval from 68 to 72, approaching but never hitting 68 and 72. Suppose that KK is
locally valid at (70, 70), with any accessible real value approaching 72 also having as epistemic
possibilities the open interval from 68 to 72. In that case, the agent does not have cliff-edge
knowledge, since there is always an ever-diminishing margin for error separating her from
the value 72. But surely such an infinitesimal margin for error is small consolation for the
opponent of cliff-edge knowledge.
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R2(r, a) = R(r, a). Now let (r∗, a) be the highest (or lowest) world in R(r, a).500
Since R2(r, a) = R(r, a), we know that R(r∗, a) = R(r, a), and S has cliff-edge501
knowledge at (r∗, a): Real(r∗, a) = [n, r∗] for some choice of n. Since Fragility502
implies that KK holds at (a, a), Fragility thus implies that there is cliff-edge503
knowledge at the maximum and minimum of Real(a, a). At any such world, (25)504
fails (although (26) can still hold). In this way, one might think that cliff-edge505
knowledge is consistent with perceptual unspecificity but not with safety from506
error.19507
5.3 Theories of knowledge508
We’ve now explored in detail the various consequences of Fragility in a general509
framework for thinking about knowledge and margins for errors. In the rest of510
this section, we consider a few candidates for what knowledge could be, consistent511
with Fragility. Building on Stalnaker 2009, Cohen and Comesaña 2013 develop512
a theory consistent with Modesty and Weak Distance where KK and hence513
Fragility are unrestrictedly valid. Epistemic accessibility is defined relative to514
a fixed minimum margin for error c; but this minimum margin for error has515
different effects in three cases. When the real value r falls within the range516
[a − c, a + c], epistemic accessibility simply produces the range of real values517
[a− c, a + c]. When the real value r falls below a− c, the possible real values518
are [r, a + c]. When the real value r rises above a + c, the possible real values519
are [a− c, r].520
(27) (r, a)R(r′, a′) if and only if a = a′ and

r ≤ r′ ≤ a + c if r < a− c
a− c ≤ r′ ≤ r if r > a + c
a− c ≤ r′ ≤ a + c otherwise
521
On this theory, cliff-edge knowledge is pervasive. As in any theory of Fragility522
consistent with Weak Distance, cliff-edge knowledge occurs at a− c and a + c.523
But cliff-edge knowledge also occurs at any value r below a− c or above a + c.524
On this theory, KK is valid. Within [a− c, a+ c], every world treats the same525
real values as possible: the range [a− c, a + c]. Above a + c, any real value can526
only see itself and any value lower, until reaching the minimum a− c. At any527
such world, epistemic accessibility is strictly included in the range [a− c, r].528
My task is to validate Fragility without KK. I will basically agree with529
Cohen and Comesaña 2013 about the behavior of epistemic accessibility within530
Real(a, a). But I offer a different theory of epistemic accessibility outside of this531
region. For Cohen and Comesaña 2013, accessibility outside of this region is532
pervaded by cliff-edge knowledge. For me, it will not be.533
In Williamson 2013a, the actual margin for error at (r, a) is the sum of the534
distance |r − a| and a fixed minimum margin for error c. I now depart from535
this theory and simply let the margin for error at (r, a) be some value m(r, a)536
19The theory in Goodman 2013 satisfies the version of Margin for Error in (25), and also
Weak Distance. For this reason, it contains no cliff-edge knowledge, and therefore invalidates
Fragility.
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determined as a function of r and a, subject to a variety of constraints. Then537
r′ is a possible real value at (r, a) just in case the distance between r′ and a is538
within the margin m(r, a).539
We can reach a substantive theory of knowledge by imposing a variety of540
constraints on margins for error. To validate Factivity, I assume that the margin541
at (r, a) is always at least as large as the distance between r and a. To validate542
Modesty, I assume that the margin at r and a is always positive. Within543
this framework, Distance corresponds to the requirement that m(r′, a) exceeds544
m(r, a) if and only if the distance between r′ and a is greater than that between545
r and a. I replace this requirement with Weak Distance, which now says that546
m(r′, a) ≥ m(r, a) if the distance between r′ and a is at least as large as that547
between r and a. This gives us the following class of models:548
Definition 5.549
1. The margin for error, m(r, a), is a function of r and a.550
2. (r, a)R(r′, a′) if and only if a = a′ and |r′ − a| ≤ m(r, a), where:551
(a) m is factive: m(r, a) ≥ |r − a|.552
(b) m is modest: m(r, a) > 0.553
(c) m is weakly monotone: if |r − a| ≤ |r′ − a|, then m(r, a) ≤ m(r′, a).554
This theory is consistent with Fragility. Fragility then corresponds to the555
constraint that there is some region around a where the margin for error is556
constant.557
Observation 3. Fragility is valid if and only if ∃i ≥ 0 : if |r − a| ≤ i, then558
m(r, a) = i.20559
My theory predicts that when appearance matches reality, the agent inhabits560
a kind of inner sanctum. For some distance around a, the margin for error is561
simply i = m(a, a), the minimum margin for error. In the range of real values562
[a−m(a, a), a + m(a, a)], the agent experiences automatic iterated knowledge.563
At any world in this area, the range of possible real values is just Real(a, a) =564
[a−m(a, a), a + m(a, a)]. Here, we have a violation of Distance that respects565
Weak Distance. The agent is not omniscient at (a, a), but their epistemic position566
does not get worse for a small period of time as reality departs from appearance.567
In the most extreme case, the agent at a+m(a, a) stands on the cliff of epistemic568
accessibility and knows that the real value is at most exactly what it is.21569
20Follows immediately from our previous observation that Fragility is valid if and only if
KK holds locally at (a, a).
21Another advantage of this theory is that it predicts that ‘what you justifiably believe
is known in all normal worlds with the same appearances’ (Goodman 2013, building on
Lasonen-Aarnio 2010). Williamson 2013b formulates a weak version of this principle:
(i) Weak Disposition to Know. For any r∗, there is some 0 < c∗ ≤ c where if
|a− r| ≤ c∗, then R(r, a) ⊆ S(r∗, a).
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KK fails at (r, a) when (r, a) can access a real value r′ which can access570
a value unavailable to (r, a). This requires that r′ is within m(r, a) of a. In571
addition, it requires that m(r′, a) exceeds m(r, a). So KK fails in the theory just572
in case there are some real values r and r′ where |r′ − a| ≤ m(r, a) < m(r′, a).573
This condition is consistent with Fragility. For this reason, the framework allows574
me to validate Fragility without validating KK.575
Since I validate Fragility, the theory makes a precise prediction about how576
epistemic accessibility behaves inside R(a, a). But this leaves unsettled how577
epistemic accessibility behaves outside of R(a, a). Perhaps the simplest option is578
to make a hybrid theory which agrees with Cohen and Comesaña 2013 within579
distance c from a, and agrees with Williamson 2013b after that.When r is beyond580
c from a, the margin m(r, a) is the sum of |r− a| and c. But within a distance of581
c from a, the margin m(r, a) is fixed at c. In this way, c becomes a lower bound582
for the agent’s epistemic power of discrimination, so that anywhere inside of c583
distance from a, the range of possible real values is just [a− c, a + c].584
(28) m(r, a) =
{
|r − a|+ c if |r − a| > c
c otherwise
585
On this interpretation, Fragility can be thought of as imposing further barriers586
on knowledge. When an agent is at (a + m(a, a), a), their epistemic position587
is already as strong as possible. Further improvements in the match between588
reality and appearance have no affect on their epistemic position, because they589
have already reached the limit of their epistemic power.590
The hybrid theory validates Fragility. For any (r, a) can access the world591
(a, a), and Real2(a, a) = Real(a, a) is guaranteed by Weak Distance to be within592
Real(r, a). But the theory still respects Modesty by requiring (a, a) to access other593
worlds. In this way, the case where appearance matches reality is epistemically594
privileged without being epistemically ideal. Finally, this theory validates KK595
locally in the range [a− c, a+ c]: when r is in this range and the agent knows A,596
the agent is guaranteed to know that they know A. But when r is outside this597
range, KK fails while Fragility remains valid. In this way, the hybrid theory is598
a minimal revision of Williamson 2013a which validates KK locally at (a, a) so599
that Fragility is valid.22600
For an illustration of this theory, consider Figure 2.601
Within [70, 80], epistemic accessibility is transitive. So the very same range of602
real possibilities is known at (75, 75), (77, 75), and (80, 75): namely, that the603
real value is between 70 and 80. But once the real value departs from what is604
Since we define justified belief so that S(r∗, a) = R(a, a), Weak Disposition to Know is valid
on our theory. In particular, let c∗ be the distance between a and the highest value in R(a, a).
Then R(a, a) is believed and known throughout the inner sanctum within c∗ distance of a,
where reality and appearance are sufficiently similar. On the other hand, for criticism of Weak
Disposition to Know, see Williamson 2013b p. 87.
22The hybrid view differs from that in Williamson 2013a and Cohen and Comesaña 2013 in
that it is discontinuous: small changes in the divergence between appearance and reality can
lead to a large change in what is known (when the real value moves just outside the range
[a− c, a + c]).
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Figure 2: A model of Weak Distance with a = 75, c = 5
epistemically possible in the good case, accessibility is no longer transitive. As605
before, 83 is an epistemically possible real value at (81, 75), and 88 is a possible606
real value at (83, 75), yet 88 is not possible at (81, 75). So the agent at (81, 75)607
knows that the temperature is between 64 and 86 degrees, but doesn’t know608
that she knows this.23609
5.4 Improbable knowledge610
The hybrid theory is not the only option. There is a reason to explore more611
dramatic departures from extant theories: we can thereby prevent improbable612
knowing. Williamson 2013b observes that Modesty and Distance generate cases613
of improbable knowing. At (a, a), R(a, a) is the strongest known proposition.614
Modesty implies that R(a, a) includes worlds besides (a, a), and Distance implies615
that R(a, a) is not known at any such world, because at any such (r, a) we616
have R(a, a) ⊂ R(r, a). In this way, Modesty and Distance generate improbable617
knowing: although R(a, a) is known at (a, a), the agent at (a, a) considers it618
unlikely that R(a, a) is known. In particular, at every epistemic possibility for619
the agent other than (a, a), R(a, a) is not known.620
To make this more precise, I follow Williamson 2011 and Williamson 2014 and621
introduce an evidential probability function Pr. I let the evidential probability622
Pr(r,a) at world (r, a) come from conditionalizing a prior Pr on R(r, a), the623
agent’s knowledge at (r, a). Improbable knowing occurs at (r, a) when there is a624
proposition p that is known at (r, a) while the probability that it is known falls625
below a threshold t. For any proposition p, let Kp = {(r′, a′) : R(r′, a′) ⊆ p} be626
the set of worlds at which p is known. Then:627
23An anonymous referee wonders about the status of further introspection principles. Con-
sider the Geach rule, that MKA |= KMA. The referee observes that Geach and Fragility
imply the ‘Shift Symmetry’ rule, that KA |= KKMA (Symmetry says that A |= KMA; Shift
Symmetry says that this rule applies when we add a K operator to the premise and conclu-
sion). Here, I note that all of the models considered in this paper validate Shift Symmetry.
Interestingly, this includes Williamson’s Appearance/Reality models, which invalidate Fragility
and yet validate Geach. An open question for future research is whether it is possible to modify
Williamson’s Appearance/Reality models to retain Geach while invalidating Fragility and Shift
Symmetry.
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(29) S has improbablet knowledge at (r, a) if and only if ∃p : (r, a) ∈ Kp and628
Pr(r,a)(Kp) ≤ t.629
Modesty and Distance imply that improbable knowledge is pervasive. At any630
world (r, a), R(r, a) is known at (r, a), but is not known at any world (r′, a)631
where the distance between r′ and a exceeds that between r and a. This means632
that R(r, a) is a case of improbable 1
2
knowing whenever the margin m(r, a) is633
twice the distance between reality and appearance |r − a|.634
When we replace Distance with Weak Distance, we can prevent improbable635
knowledge. As the distance between reality and appearance grows, the epistemic636
possibilities cannot diminish. But they may sometimes stay the same. To avoid637
improbable knowing, we can create bands of constancy. As we move from (r, a)638
to worlds (r′, a) further from r but still inside R(r, a), we can for a while retain639
the same epistemic possibilities, so that R(r′, a) = R(r, a).640
(30) Bands of constancy. R has a band of constancy at (r, a) of length n641
if and only if R(r + n, a) = R(r, a).642
To avoid KK, however, we allow that there are some worlds (r∗, a) ∈ R(r, a)643
where the epistemic possibilities expand, so that R(r, a) ⊂ R(r∗, a).644
We can use bands of constancy to prevent improbable knowing. Assume Pr645
is indifferent. Then we can guarantee that whenever S knows p at (r, a), the646
evidential probability that S knows p is at least t. This is simply a matter of647
ensuring that the band of constancy at (r, a) is sufficiently large.648
Observation 4. If for every (r, a), R has a band of constancy at (r, a) of length649
x > t×m(r, a)− |a− r|, then S lacks improbablet knowledge.24650
For example, with m(80, 75) = 10, Real(80, 75) = [65, 85]. Throughout r =651
[70, 80], R(80, 75) is known. But given Distance, R(80, 75) is not known at any652
r > 80. So at (80, 75), R(80, 75) has an evidential probability of 12 . Since we653
reject Distance, we can create a band of constancy of length 3 beyond (80, 75).654
This means that R(83, 75) = R(80, 75) ⊂ R(84, 75). On the resulting theory, the655
evidential probability at (80, 75) of knowing R(80, 75) is at least 45 .656
All that is left is to find an interpretation of knowledge on which it plausibly657
has bands of constancy. One option here, drawing on Goodman 2013, looks to658
normality.659
24Take arbitrary (r, a). We must show that R(r, a) is known throughout at least t proportion
of worlds in R(r, a). After all, if R(r, a) is known there, so is any other proposition known at
(r, a). Now suppose r > a. Given symmetry, we can then confine our attention to the status of
R(r, a) at real values above a. Weak Distance implies that R(r, a) is known at any real value
between a and r. To prevent improbable knowing, we must guarantee that R(r+x, a) = R(r, a)
for some distance x above r. In particular, we must show that
|a−r|+x
m(r,a)
> t, so that the region
extending from a upwards beyond r to length x is greater than m(r, a), the size of the region
above a which is epistemically possible. In that case, the region in which S knows R(r, a)
will make up greater than t proportion of the epistemic possibilities at (r, a). This equation
simplifies to x > t×m(r, a)− |a− r|.
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If things are normal, then what you know is that they aren’t extraor-660
dinary; if things aren’t normal, you know less. (Goodman 2013, p.661
46)662
At any world, some worlds count as normal, some as extraordinary, and some as663
neither. Then we can say that at any world, what an agent knows is simply that664
things aren’t extraordinary by the lights of that world. The resulting picture665
motivates bands of constancy. At any world (r, a), it would be extraordinary for666
r to be significantly further from a than it is. But if r were slightly further from667
a, the same values would be extraordinary. This gives us bands of constancy. As668
r moves further away from a towards the extraordinary, but before r becomes669
extraordinary, the standards for normality weaken, so that more worlds become670
normal and the extraordinary moves further away. In this way, KK fails (for more671
on the contingency of normality and its consequences for KK, see Carter 2018).672
Finally, to validate Fragility we distinguish the good case where reality meets673
appearance. In the good case, any world that isn’t extraordinary has the same674
standards for normality. In this way, we experience no jump in possibility until675
we have moved into an extraordinary case. This gives us a realistic interpretation676
for our theory, validating Fragility and allowing bands of constancy once reality677
and appearance diverge sufficiently.678
In this section, I’ve shown that it is possible to endorse Fragility while679
also accepting that knowledge is subject to a form of margin for error. To do680
so, we must allow that appearance can diverge from reality without creating681
further barriers to knowing. We must also allow that the margin for error when682
appearance meets reality is sufficiently smaller than other margins for error.683
In this way, opponents of KK may explain the infelicity of dubious assertions684
by validating Fragility. One cost of the theory is the existence of a case of685
cliff-edge knowledge, with automatic iterated knowledge in the inner sanctum686
where appearance approximates reality. One advantage of the theory is that it687
allows bands of constancy, preventing improbable knowing.688
In the last part of the paper, I explore more complex dubious assertions, and689
show how to generalize Fragility to explain them.690
6 Generalizations691
6.1 Other attitudes692
Some dubious assertions are more complex than (1), involving mixed attitudes of693
belief and knowledge. Sosa 2009 observes that each of the following is infelicitous:694
(31) a. #p but I doubt that I know that p.695
b. #p but I believe that I don’t know that p.696
c. #p but I have no justification for believing that I know that p.697
d. #p but I have (sufficient) justification for believing that I don’t698
know that p.699
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Fragility implies that each of the conjunctions above is unknowable. In each700
case, the argument is roughly the same: we can show that the iterated state in701
the second conjunct of the dubious assertion is logically as strong as the state of702
not knowing that one knows. For this reason, assuming that knowledge is closed703
under simple deduction, anyone who knows any of these conjunctions knows the704
dubious assertion (1) with which we began.705
Start with (31-a). Knowledge is incompatible with doubt. So if S doubts706
that S knows that p, then S doesn’t know that S knows p. So if S knows that p707
and that S doubts that S knows p, then S knows that S doubts that S knows p.708
But since this last bit of knowledge implies that S doesn’t know that S knows p,709
we now have that S knows that S doesn’t know that S knows p. This contradicts710
Fragility, since we also have that S knows p. In short, this complex assertion711
is logically stronger than (1), our original dubious assertion. Since the weaker712
dubious assertion is unknowable, so is the stronger.713
The same argument applies to each of the other dubious assertions above.714
For (31-b), we assume that if S believes that S doesn’t know that p, then S715
doesn’t know that S knows p. For (31-c), we assume that if S is not justified in716
believing that she knows p, then S doesn’t know that she knows p. After all,717
knowledge requires justification. For (31-d), we assume that if S is justified in718
believing she doesn’t know p, then she doesn’t know that she knows p.719
Fragility is a powerful principle. It has consequences for various patterns of720
iterations of belief, justification, and ignorance. In this way, Fragility provides a721
systematic theory of dubious assertion.722
6.2 Higher orders723
Another way to generalize the phenomenon of dubious assertion involves further724
iterations of knowledge. For example, perhaps the following assertions are725
infelicitous in the same sense as (1):726
(32) a. p but I don’t know that I know that I know that p.727
b. p but I don’t know that I know that I know that I know that p.728
c. . . .729
Fragility alone does not predict that (32-a) and its ilk are unknowable. To do730
so, Fragility would have to imply:731
(33) If S knows that S doesn’t know that S know that S knows p, then S732
doesn’t know that p.733
But Fragility does not have this consequence. Note that the antecedent of (33)734
does not imply the antecedent of Fragility. This follows from the more general735
fact that an agent can be ignorant of having second order knowledge without736
being ignorant of having first order knowledge.737
If we wish to predict that (32-a) and its ilk are unknowable, we can introduce738
strengthened versions of Fragility, such as (33). To better understand such739
stronger principles, let Kn abbreviates n consecutive occurrences of K. Then we740
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can formalize equivalents of higher order principles like (33) with the following741
schema:742
(34) Fragilityn. KA→MKnA743
(33) is equivalent to the instance Fragility3.744
The results from above extend to further iterations. First, we can introduce745
the concept of the n-ancestral of R, which relates w and v just in case v can be746
reached from w through n applications of R. Then Fragilityn corresponds to a747
generalization of jump transitivity, where every world w can see some world v748
where any world accessible from v by the n-ancestral of R is accessible from w749
by R.750
Definition 6.751
1. (a) wR1u if and only if wRu752
(b) wRnu if and only if ∃v : wRn−1v & vRu753
2. R is jump transitiven if and only if ∃v ∈ Rw : Rnv ⊆ Rw754
Observation 5. Fragilityn is valid if and only if R is jump transitiven.25755
There is a structural difference between KK and Fragility. Once KK is valid,756
so is any further iteration of KK. KK implies for example that:757
(35) If S knows that p, then S knows that S knows that S knows that p.758
For this reason, the validity of KK immediately implies that Rnw ⊆ Rw for759
every n. So KK implies that Fragilityn is valid for every choice of n. So the760
validity of KK implies that every dubious assertion in (32) is unknowable and761
hence unassertable. By contrast, if we reject KK and accept Fragility, then762
in order to predict the unassertability of (32) we must accept each instance of763
Fragilityn as a separate constraint on knowledge.764
This flexibility may be a bug or a feature, depending on the data. As Benton765
2013 warns us, it is important to distinguish ‘clashes’ from ‘clunks’. Perhaps at766
high levels of iteration, instances of (32) are not infelicitous in the same way as767
(1). They may instead simply be unparsable. Perhaps these conjunctions are768
knowable at some level of processing, but are so difficult to entertain consciously769
that they are strange to say.770
We saw above that Fragility encodes the idea that an agent’s knowledge of p771
is defeated by the information that her epistemic position with respect to p is772
not ideal. But here we might distinguish different degrees of epistemic ideality.773
Failing to know that one knows p is not ideal. Failing to know that one knows774
that one knows p is not ideal in another way. Perhaps the first failure defeats775
25Suppose R is jump transitiven and w |= KMnA. Then ∀v ∈ Rw : Rnv ∩ A 6= ∅. By
jump transitivityn, ∃v∗ ∈ Rw : Rnv∗ ⊆ Rw. So Rw ∩ A 6= ∅. So w |= MA. Conversely,
suppose that R is not jump transitiven. Then ∀v ∈ Rw : ∃z ∈ Rnv : z 6∈ Rw. Let
A = {w | ∃v ∈ Rw : z ∈ Rnv & z 6∈ Rw}. w |= KMnA, since ∀v ∈ Rw : v |= MnA. But
w 6|= MA, since ¬∃v ∈ Rw : v ∈ A.
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knowledge in a way that the second does not. We can express this distinction by776
developing a theory of knowledge in which jump transitivity is valid but jump777
transitivityn is not valid for all n.778
On the other hand, we also considered the prospects for reconciling Fragility779
with Margin for Error. Interestingly, the theory I developed predicts that Fragility780
is valid if and only if Fragility is valid at every order. On that theory, I replaced781
Distance by Weak Distance and generated an inner sanctum of worlds where782
reality is similar enough to appearance that epistemic possibility is the same as783
when appearance agrees exactly with reality. On that view, KK holds locally at784
the point where appearance matches reality, and so we have jump transitivityn785
at every order.26786
26Thanks to the audience of the 2019 Goethe Epistemology Meeting.
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